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Abstract
Human languages vary in many ways, but also show strik-
ing cross-linguistic universals. Why do these universals ex-
ist? Recent theoretical results demonstrate that Bayesian learn-
ers transmitting language to each other through iterated learn-
ing will converge on a distribution of languages that depends
only on their prior biases about language and the quantity of
data transmitted at each point; the structure of the world being
communicated about plays no role (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005,
2007). We revisit these findings and show that when certain as-
sumptions about the independence of languages and the world
are abandoned, learners will converge to languages that depend
on the structure of the world as well as their prior biases. These
theoretical results are supported with a series of experiments
showing that when human learners acquire language through
iterated learning, the ultimate structure of those languages is
shaped by the structure of the meanings to be communicated.
Keywords: language evolution; iterated learning; Bayesian
modeling; linguistic structure
Introduction
Human languages have rich structure on many levels, from
phonology to semantics to grammar. Where does this struc-
ture come from? Most researchers agree that linguistic struc-
ture is shaped by the structure of our minds – that our brains
contain prior biases that favor the acquisition or retention of
some linguistic systems over others. As such, debate gen-
erally centers around the nature and origin of these biases.
Some suggest that the human language faculty is genetically
specified, with natural selection operating on genes for lan-
guage (e.g., Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Nowak, Komarova, &
Niyogi, 2001; Komarova & Nowak, 2001) or else selecting
for other capabilities (e.g., Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002).
Others have suggested that humans easily learn language not
because of a language-specific genetically encoded mecha-
nism, but because language evolved to be learnable and use-
able by human brains (e.g. Zuidema, 2002; Brighton, Smith,
& Kirby, 2005; Christiansen & Chater, 2008). While these
accounts disagree in many particulars, they agree that the
structure of language arises from the structure of the brain.
In this paper we argue that language evolution is shaped by
the structure of the world in addition to pre-existing cognitive
biases. Because language involves communicating about the
world, the structure of that world (i.e., the things to be com-
municated) can interact with people’s prior biases to shape
the languages that develop. We offer theoretical and exper-
imental support of this proposition. On the theoretical side,
we take as our starting point recent work within the “iterated
learning” framework (in which new learners receive their data
Figure 1: (a) Schematic illustration of the typical iterated learning
paradigm, which assumes that learner n acquires language on the
basis of the language data produced by learner n− 1. (b) A dif-
ferent view of iterated learning recognizes that because individuals
produce language in order to communicate about the world, the data
available to learners includes meanings in the world as well as the
linguistic data produced by the learner before them.
from previous learners). Previous research has shown that
when learners are individually Bayesian, an iterated learning
chain converges in the limit to the prior distribution over all
possible languages (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005, 2007). How-
ever, the proof of this assumes a priori that a language carries
no assumptions about the frequencies of events in the world.
As we will show, when this assumption is relaxed, the iterated
learning process converges to a distribution that depends on
the distribution of meaningful events in the world as well as
the prior biases of the learner. We experimentally test these
theoretical results in a lab-based iterated learning experiment
(as in, e.g., Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008) and find that par-
ticipants converge on different languages depending on the
structure of the space of meanings they are shown.
Iterated learning
The iterated learning modeling (ILM) framework is widely
used in language evolution research (e.g., Kirby & Hurford,
2002; Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2008; Smith,
2009; Reali & Griffiths, 2009). It views the process of lan-
guage evolution in terms of a chain of learners (or genera-
tions), shown schematically in Figure 1(a). The first learner
in the chain sees some linguistic data (e.g., utterances), forms
a hypothesis about what sort of language would have gener-
ated that data, and then produces their own data, which serves
as input to the next learner in the chain. Over time, the lan-
guages that emerge from this process become non-arbitrary:
Griffiths and Kalish (2005, 2007) (henceforth, GK) demon-
Figure 2: (a) Intuitive illustration of the results of Griffiths & Kalish
(2005, 2007) (GK). Given a 2-dimensional semantic space, a learner
with a prior bias to favor one dimension of that space (the x-axis)
and languages with fewer words might have a prior distribution over
languages that puts more probability on ha and less on hb or hc.
GK demonstrate that the languages that evolve will converge to this
prior distribution. (b) If the natural categories in the world have a
different structure, we might intuitively expect that languages that
capture that structure, like hc, should be more likely to evolve.
strate that when the learners are Bayesian, we should expect
an iterated learning chain to converge to the prior distribution
over all possible languages. That is, the probability of any
given language emerging does not depend on the structure of
the world or independent properties of the language – only
the assumptions of the learner. The existence of a linguis-
tic bottleneck (in which only a small amount of information
is transmitted at each link in the chain) can speed the rate
of convergence or create a pressure for certain kinds of lin-
guistic structure like compositionality, but this result implies
that neither the structure of the meaning space nor the nature
of the initial language should have an affect on the language
that eventually evolves.
GK’s result can be conceptualized in intuitive terms as fol-
lows. Suppose learners must acquire languages that describe
a two dimensional semantic space of some sort. For illustra-
tive purposes, suppose further that the learners have a prior
bias to prefer languages with fewer words and to pay more
attention to one of the dimensions, as occurs in human cate-
gory learning and development (e.g., Landau, Smith, & Jones,
1988). This prior bias might impose a distribution over hy-
potheses h about possible languages, like the illustrative one
shown in Figure 2(a): languages like ha with a few words
that classify according to the preferred dimension (the x-axis
in this case) have higher prior probability than languages like
hb, which have many words, or hc, whose words classify ac-
cording to the dis-preferred dimension. GK suggest that lan-
guages evolving to describe this space will converge to the
prior distribution: 40% of the time ha will emerge, 10% of
the time hb will emerge, and so forth. Although this prior and
these precise numbers are imaginary, the picture provides a
schematic illustration of what GK’s results mean.
It also, however, highlights an apparent oddity within these
results. Suppose that the world possesses structure in the form
of natural categories of some sort, and these natural categories
happen to group items according to the non-preferred dimen-
sion, as shown in Figure 2(b): the items observed by the
learner – generated by the world – correspond to the black
dots, which fall naturally into two clusters. We might intu-
itively expect that a language like hc would be a better fit
to this world (and hence be more likely to evolve) than a
language like ha, even though ha has higher prior probabil-
ity. The results of GK appear to suggest otherwise. Is our
intuition simply wrong, or is there a mismatch between the
GK derivation and the problem of language evolution within
a structured world? In the next section, we argue for the latter.
Theoretical result
We formalize the iterated learning framework in much the
same way as Griffiths and Kalish (2005). A learner sees
m meanings or events, denoted x = {x(1) . . .x(m)}. These
meanings are paired with m corresponding utterances de-
noted y = {y(1) . . .y(m)}. The first learner in the chain is
shown some initial data consisting of meaning-utterance pairs
(x0,y0). Then, when shown new events x1, the learner pro-
duces utterances y1, so that (x1,y1) are the input to the next
learner. In general, learner n + 1 sees data (xn,yn) and gener-
ates yn+1 given events xn+1, so that the next learner receives
input (xn+1,yn+1). The goal of each learner is to estimate
the mapping between meanings and utterances, which cor-
responds to learning the language they are exposed to. It is
assumed that each learner has the same countable hypothesis
space H of possible languages, such that each h ∈ H corre-
sponds to one language. For any learner, acquisition involves
a learning step and a production step.
In the learning step, learner n + 1 sees (xn,yn) and com-
putes a posterior distribution over possible languages hn+1.






In their derivation GK assume that each language h makes
no assumption about which events x are more likely than any
other; given that assumption, they note that P(h|x) = P(h),
and proceed with a version of Equation 1 based on that modi-
fication. Alternatively, however, it might be that the language
carries with it certain assumptions about what events are pos-
sible or probable in the world, in which case the GK assump-
tion is untenable.1 In other words, simply observing mean-
ingful events x may bias the learner to prefer some languages
over others. If this is the case, then P(h|x) does not equal
P(h), and the learning step is described by Equation 1.
To see what this shift does to the iterated learning chain,
we now turn to the production step. In this step, the learner
1More formally, GK assume that each language h specifies
P(y|h,x), the conditional distribution over utterances y given the
events x. Our formulation corresponds to assuming that each lan-
guage maps onto a joint (subjective) probability distribution over
events and utterances, P(x,y|h). We can factorize the joint dis-
tribution P(x,y|h) = P(y|x,h)P(x|h). Moreover, since P(h|x) ∝
P(x|h)P(h), in our set up P(h|x) 6= P(h).
encounters new meanings xn+1, generated from the (objec-
tive) distribution Q(x) of meanings in the world. Given these
meanings, the learner generates the new utterances yn+1 by
sampling them from P(yn+1|xn+1,hn+1), where hn+1 is the
learner’s language (assumed to be sampled from the posterior
distribution in Equation 1).
Since all people in the chain follow the same learning and
production steps, we can calculate P(hn+1|hn), the probabil-
ity that learner n + 1 acquires language hn+1 given that the






Thus we have a sequence of random variables h1,h2,h3, . . .
describing the languages acquired by each person in the
chain. This is generated by a Markov chain whose transition
probabilities are given by P(hn+1|hn). Assuming the chain is




for all hn+1. Put another way, the probability distribution over
languages hn approaches pi(hn) as n → ∞.
In the set up used by GK, the stationary distribution pi(h)
corresponds to the prior P(h). However, under our formal-
ization this is no longer the case. To find the stationary dis-
tribution in this situation, we make the following “represen-
tativeness” assumption: that the posterior probability of a
hypothesis given an actual dataset x is close to its expected
posterior probability given the generating distribution Q(x).
In other words, we assume that P(h|x) ≈ EQ(x′)[P(h|x′)] =
∑x′ P(h|x′)Q(x′), for some x ∼ Q(x). The math demonstrates
that if this assumption holds, then the stationary distribution
is approximately pi(h) = ∑x P(h|x)Q(x). That is, the chain
converges to the expected posterior distribution over lan-
guages given meaningful events in the world. This is because
for pi(h) = ∑x P(h|x)Q(x) to be the stationary distribution it
















































The assumption these results depend on is relatively weak:
all it requires is that the events or meanings each learner sees
be a representative sample from the true generating distribu-
tion Q(x). In the limit where no learner sees any data, the
stationary distribution converges to the prior, since P(h|x) =
P(h) in that situation. But as the amount of data increases,
the languages that evolve will depend on the posterior distri-
bution P(h|x) and the distribution of meanings in the world
Q(x). Since the posterior depends on both prior and likeli-
hood (P(h|x) ∝ P(h)P(x|h)), this means that the languages
that evolve will be sampled from a distribution depending on
which ones are favored a priori as well as which ones best
capture the meanings in the world. The additional Q(x) term
means that the distribution of those meanings matters as well.
These results suggest that languages like hc might be more
likely to evolve in a world like the one in Figure 2(b) than the
prior distribution over languages might suggest.
In the next section we report experimental results support-
ing these theoretical findings.
Experiment
Method
We adopt the standard iterated learning paradigm, in which
participants form chains in which the output of the nth partic-
ipant is the input of participant n+1 and the input for the first
participant is random. In a training phase, participants see a
number of meaning-word pairs and are asked to learn them.
In a test phase, they are shown meanings and asked to pro-
duce the corresponding word; these are the pairings for the
next participant and correspond to the “language” that exists
at that point in the chain. Our question is whether the lan-
guages that evolve over the course of a chain depend on the
distribution of meanings Q(x).
In our experiments, the “meanings” consisted of 36 pos-
sible squares differing in size and color, as shown in Fig-
ure 3(a). In the CONTROL condition, the stimuli continuously
varied along two dimensions: color and size.2 In this condi-
tion there is no obvious or privileged way of categorizing the
stimuli. In the SIZE condition, the stimuli were more discon-
tinuous along the size dimension while in the COLOR condi-
tion they were discontinuous along the color dimension.3
These conditions, then, correspond to worlds with different
event distributions Q(x), and each favors languages that par-
tition the stimuli in different ways, as shown in Figure 3(b).
In the SIZE condition one would expect the words to cate-
gorize by size, in particular, to correspond to the distinction
between smaller (w1) and larger (w2) items. Conversely, one
would expect the words in the COLOR condition to evolve
2Color varied from 0% brightness (black) to 100% brightness
(white) in increments of 20%, and size from smallest (10x10) to
largest (60x60) in increments of 10.
3In particular, stimuli 2 and 5 from the CONTROL condition be-
came 3 and 4, with the new 2 and 5 intermediate in value. Thus in
the SIZE condition the final sizes were 10x10, 15x15, 20x20, 50x50,
55x55, and 60x60, and in the COLOR condition the final colors were
0%, 10%, 20%, 80%, 90%, and 100% brightness.
Figure 3: (a) Space of stimuli seen in each of the three condi-
tions of the experiment. Stimuli in the CONTROL condition varied
continuously along the dimensions of size and color; in the SIZE
condition they varied discontinuously according to size, and in the
COLOR condition they varied discontinuously along the color di-
mension. These different spaces thus impose different event dis-
tributions Q(x). (b) Schematic illustration of the predictions about
what the evolved language should look like in each condition. In the
SIZE condition, the words should evolve to categorize the stimuli ac-
cording to size, with one word (w1) applying to the smaller objects
and the other (w2) applying to the larger ones; in the COLOR condi-
tion the words should split the space into the dark (w1) and light (w2)
objects. Predictions for the CONTROL condition are more uncertain,
since there are no natural boundaries within this space.
to distinguish between darker (w1) and lighter (w2) stimuli.
Because the CONTROL condition contains stimuli that vary
continuously along both dimensions, it is more unclear what
the resulting language should look like. If participants have
a prior bias to favor one dimension more than another, one
might expect the resulting language to have six words, one
for each value along the most important dimension; if they do
not have any strong prior bias, one might expect languages to
vary idiosyncratically, or to evolve towards having one word
for all stimuli. Which of these happens is somewhat irrelevant
for our purposes; the main goal of running the CONTROL con-
dition was to provide a comparison for the other conditions,
and to make apparent any prior biases that might exist.
Our main question was whether the structure of the result-
ing language would be different in the SIZE and COLOR con-
ditions. We tested this by running two chains of 20 partici-
pants in each of the conditions using a methodology based on
Kirby et al. (2008). For each participant, stimuli were pseudo-
randomly divided into two sets of equal size: the SEEN and
UNSEEN sets.4 Each participant acquired the language in a
single session consisting of three rounds, each containing a
training and a testing phase, with an optional break in be-
tween rounds. In the training phases, participants were shown
two randomized exposures to the SEEN set (36 trials in to-
4Stimuli were randomly assigned except for the constraints that
there had to be at least 4 stimuli from each quadrant and 1 stimulus
from each row and column in the SEEN set.
Figure 4: Final languages (at the 20th participant in the chain) in
each of the two chains in each of the conditions. It is evident that
the structure of the stimulus space has a considerable impact on the
structure of the resulting language; both languages in the SIZE con-
dition evolved words that categorized more according to size, both
languages in the COLOR condition evolved words that categorized
more according to color, and both languages in the CONTROL con-
dition were not strongly driven by either dimension.
tal) in which each stimulus was shown on a computer screen
with the corresponding word printed below it. In the testing
phases, participants were shown the stimuli and asked to type
the corresponding word; they were never given feedback. The
testing phases in the first two rounds contained a random half
of the SEEN set and a random half of the UNSEEN set (18 trials
total). The final round of testing contained the entire stimulus
set (i.e., all 36 stimuli).
The first participants in each chain were shown a language
consisting of 36 consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) words
randomly assigned to each of the possible 36 possible stim-
uli. For subsequent participants, the language consisted of the
meaning-word pairs given by the previous participant in their
final round of testing. We performed no filtering at any stage.
Results
The final languages in the two chains in each condition are
shown in Figure 4. It is evident that there was a substantial
effect of condition on the structure of the resulting languages;
both chains in the SIZE condition evolved words whose pri-
mary categorization divided the stimuli by size, and both
chains in the COLOR condition evolved words which catego-
rized according to color (although this effect was stronger for
Chain A than Chain B).
The difference between conditions can be quantified using
the adjusted Rand Index (adjR) of Hubert and Arabie (1985).
This measure captures the similarity between clusterings; an
adjR of 1 indicates that the clusters are identical, while 0 is the
score one would expect when comparing two random cluster-
ings; scores below 0 indicate that the clusters match less than
one would expect by chance. Here, each of the resulting lan-
guages corresponds to one “clustering” of the stimuli; for in-
stance, the language in Chain A of the COLOR condition cor-
Figure 5: All participants in all of the chains in the iterated learning experiment. Languages in different conditions evolved in different ways,
reflecting the different structure of the meaning space across conditions. Different shades indicate different words.
responds to a clustering in which the 18 darkest stimuli are in
one cluster and the 18 lightest stimuli are in another. We can
compare each of the actual clusterings to the canonical color
and size clusterings in Figure 3(b). The results are shown in
Table 1. It is evident that the languages in the COLOR condi-
tion have a much higher adjR when compared to the canonical
color clustering, and languages in the SIZE condition have a
much higher adjR when compared to the canonical size clus-
tering. These results are somewhat preliminary since they
incorporate only two chains per condition; nevertheless, they
are consistent, and this number of chains is not unusual for
iterated learning studies.




Table 1: Average adjR values for the final languages in each con-
dition (rows), compared to the canonical clusterings according to
size and color (columns). The languages in the CONTROL condition
match with both of the canonical sortings no more than they would
by chance, but the languages in the other conditions match with their
canonical clusterings far above chance.
Our mathematical derivation implies that an iterated learn-
ing chain will converge to a distribution over languages, not
a single language. We therefore examine the languages at
each step in the chain, shown in Figure 5. They support the
theoretical result: after an initial period in which the number
of words decreases dramatically, which is typical for iterated
learning experiments, the chains in different conditions sta-
bilize on languages that carve up the meaning space in ways
appropriate to the structure of that space in that condition.
Discussion
Our work indicates that if there is no a priori assumption that
a learner’s hypotheses about languages are independent of the
world they inhabit, then the languages evolved by Bayesian
learners through iterated learning will converge to a distribu-
tion that depends on the posterior probability over languages
as well as the structure of the meaning space. Here we con-
sider some of the implications and limitations of our findings.
Our results differ significantly from previous results by
Griffiths and Kalish (2005, 2007) that suggest that the sta-
tionary distribution of a chain of Bayesian iterated learners
depends only on their prior. This divergence arises because
GK assume that learners’ distribution over languages is in-
dependent of the structure of the world,5 whereas we make
no such assumption. Which assumption is correct is an open
question, although we suggest that in at least some circum-
stances – especially in the case of semantic categories – ours
is plausible. Language learners only start acquiring words af-
ter having observed many objects and events in the world, and
it seems reasonable for them to expect word meanings to map
onto these objects and events in a sensible way. The map-
ping between grammar and world structure is less obvious,
but one might expect that learners’ grammatical expectations
are affected by their observations of the world (e.g., expect-
ing salient or frequent characteristics, like number or gender,
5One might be tempted to just redefine the prior P(h) in GK’s
results to include the collection of items in the world. However,
unless all learners have observed the exact same set of items, their
formalism cannot not in fact be interpreted this way, since their proof
assumes that all learners share the same prior. Nor is this consistent
with how the GK results are usually discussed in the literature.
to be marked grammatically).
It is important to clarify one subtle point that may be con-
fusing. The original Griffiths and Kalish (2007) did identify
a dependence on the quantity of data transmitted each gen-
eration. However, this is a very different dependence than
we identify here. When learners sample languages from their
posterior, the only effect of increasing quantities of data is
to decrease the rate of convergence to the prior; it does not
change the actual stationary distribution. They also show that
if learners maximize the posterior rather than sample from it,
the stationary distribution is centered at the maximum of the
posterior. However, this is still different from our results, be-
cause there is no role of the structure of meaning space Q(x).
There has been a lot of experimental work supporting the
finding that iterated learning experiments reveal human learn-
ers’ inductive biases (e.g., Kalish, Griffiths, & Lewandowsky,
2007; Griffiths, Christian, & Kalish, 2008; Kirby et al., 2008;
Reali & Griffiths, 2009; Smith & Wonnacott, 2010). How do
we reconcile our results with this research? First, we do not
deny that prior biases are a factor; our results simply suggest
that they are not the only factor. Second, in all of these ex-
periments, the world never has significant structure: the set of
meanings x occur with approximately equal probability. The
world structure Q(x) is also never manipulated between con-
ditions: all participants see the same distribution of events.6
As a result, any effect of world structure may be easy to miss.
Our work does not invalidate any of these results, since none
of these experiments were made investigate the role of world
structure. We do predict that in these experiments, significant
changes in the distribution Q(x) should result in different sta-
tionary distributions of the chains.
Our findings may also resolve an apparent contradiction in
the literature. While many results have suggested that lan-
guage evolution should converge to the prior, there is also
work showing that the structure of the meaning space can
also affect the nature of the evolving language (e.g., Kirby,
2001; Brighton & Kirby, 2001; Smith, Kirby, & Brighton,
2003; Maurits, Perfors, & Navarro, 2010). Our result offers
an explanation for why such a dependence might exist.
This work is still preliminary. Additional experimental
tests of our theoretical predictions include varying the fre-
quency of meanings and initializing chains with languages
that do not match the space of meanings (e.g., initializing
participants who see the meaning space from the COLOR con-
dition with a language conforming to the canonical size pat-
tern). In addition, a great deal of theoretical work remains.
Existing work investigates how GK’s results are affected if
the chain consists of more than one learner per generation
(Smith, 2009; Burkett & Griffiths, 2010), or if learners are ca-
pable of “teaching” subsequent learners in the chain (Beppu
& Griffiths, 2009). How would our results be affected un-
der these circumstances? There are many remaining open
6Note that in some experiments, for instance Kalish et al. (2007)
and Griffiths et al. (2008), the mapping between meanings x and
utterances (or utterance equivalents) y is different, at least for the
initial person in the chain. However, Q(x) itself is never varied.
questions in addition to these, but our results indicate that
the world may matter more than we previously thought. Per-
haps language has the structure it does not just because of our
brains, but because of the world as well.
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